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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IS OFTEN thought of as written text, or perhaps more 
specifcally, the product of judicial interpretive techniques applied to written text. 
To the extent that practices of governmental actors are constitutionalised, these are 
usually understood to be unenforceable conventions “distinct from the ordinary 
‘law of the constitution.’”1 Practices of governmental actors are not generally 
thought to have constitutional force or signifcance more broadly. Trough a 
systematic review of federalism jurisprudence from the last ffty years, this article 
investigates the ways in which justices of the SCC conceive of, and attribute 
signifcance to, government traditions or practices when resolving jurisdictional 
challenges. Tis article concludes that government practice has a gravitational 
pull in at least some kinds of constitutional decision-making. Te nature of that 
pull—the diferent ways in which justices of the Court understand government 
practice to be relevant—is explained and categorised in this article. 
Tis article has three related objectives. First, the article identifes what role, 
if any, past practice plays in validity cases involving sections 91 and 92 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867.2 Based on an exhaustive review of SCC decisions from the 
last fve decades, this article develops a taxonomy of uses to which government 
practice is put in validity cases. Tis taxonomy forms the bulk of the article. Te 
1. Michael Plaxton, “Te Caretaker Convention and Supreme Court Appointments” (2016) 72 
SCLR (2d) 455 at 456. 
2. (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3. Jurisprudence and judicial commentary on applicability and 
operability have been excluded from the study. Tis study is empirical and systematic, 
evaluating validity jurisprudence in the previous fve decades in order to make the claim that 
the use of past practice is an observable trend found in a signifcant portion of this case law. 
Tus, given the structured nature of the study and the number of cases assessed, the study 
was limited to validity to ensure manageability. Additionally, validity is a discrete topic, and 
can thus be uncoupled and discussed separately from other division of powers doctrines. 
Future research should be undertaken to confrm that the patterns identifed in this article 
hold true in the context of applicability and operability jurisprudence. 
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other two objectives focus on understanding why justices might appeal to past 
practice to resolve validity claims. Second, the article asks how justices explain the 
relevance of past practice to validity determinations. As discussed below, justices 
have not clearly or consistently explained how and when past practice is relevant. 
While it seems that justices instinctively fnd practice appealing, they have not 
articulated a broader theory to explain why it should exert a pull in validity 
cases (and indeed, they may have no grand cohesive theory at all). Finally, the 
article asks: Even in the absence of express explanation, can judicial references to 
prior government activity—particularly when it is employed as an interpretative 
tool—be satisfactorily explained? 
An example illustrates these objectives: Imagine that a provincial statute 
prohibits private clinics from providing abortions.3 When a court considers 
whether the province has constitutional jurisdiction to pass such legislation, does 
it matter that the federal government has historically regulated abortion and that 
provinces have not traditionally acted in this area? If this prior activity matters, 
how do justices understand and articulate its signifcance? Tese are the questions 
that occupy this article. 
To date, how government practice informs federalism cases has received 
little, if any, scholarly attention outside of the cooperative federalism context. 
Addressing that gap, this article contributes to the literature on constitutional 
interpretation by highlighting the relevance of actual practice to judicial 
decision-making. 
A few preliminary comments are in order. First, this article focuses on 
federalism and not Charter case law. As Charter jurisprudence matures and 
settles, it has become clear that its sometimes-overlooked constitutional twin, 
federalism, has not been dislodged in terms of relevance and importance. Many 
modern complexities will be resolved—or impeded—by federalism, including the 
massive challenge of implementing efective environmental legislation.4 Recent 
doctrinal developments in division of powers law afrm the ongoing evolution 
in this area.5 Accordingly, identifying how courts decide federalism disputes and 
which factors are given weight in federalism cases remains a pressing concern. 
3. See R v Morgentaler, [1993] 3 SCR 463 [Morgentaler]. 
4. See e.g. Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2019 SKCA 40; Reference re 
Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2020 ABCA 74; Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution 
Pricing Act, 2019 ONCA 544; Reference re Environmental Management Act, 2020 SCC 1; 
Orphan Well Association v Grant Tornton Ltd, 2019 SCC 5. 
5. See e.g. Canadian Western Bank v Alberta, 2007 SCC 22; Quebec (Attorney General) v 
Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 14 [Quebec v Canada]; Alberta (Attorney General) v 
Moloney, 2015 SCC 15. 







Second, this article focuses on the Court’s descriptions of past practices 
and its explanations for why those practices are legally signifcant. Accordingly, 
I have not confrmed the existence of these practices with reference to secondary 
material; the Court’s description of, and attention to, a practice is of interest, 
not the actual, verifable existence of that practice in the historical record.6 
Additionally, this article does not provide a normative argument for or against 
the use of government practice in constitutional interpretation.7 Tis article’s 
novel contribution lies in its exhaustive and systematic investigation of validity 
jurisprudence and its development of a taxonomy to organise and understand the 
diferent uses to which past practice is put in these federalism cases. 
Finally, I must address the relationship between the trends identifed in this 
article and cooperative federalism. While cooperative federalism is discussed 
in a little more detail later in this article, the topic does not receive substantial 
attention, as surprisingly few cooperative federalism cases met the requisite criteria 
for inclusion in this study (i.e., section 91 or 92 validity cases that referenced 
practice).8 Te topics of cooperative federalism and past practice intersect, united 
by the common theme of judicial deference to government activity. 
6. Similarly, this study does not include cases in which a party appealed to practice, but 
members of the Court did not pick up on that party’s argument. Indeed, legislative practice 
may play a vital behind-the-scenes role in many cases, as it may shape how parties frame the 
challenge or lead parties to concede the constitutionality of certain provisions. For example, 
it appears that the parties in Rio Hotel agreed that certain Criminal Code provisions were 
valid on the basis of historical federal legislative practice. See Rio Hotel Ltd v New Brunswick 
(Liquor Licensing Board), [1987] 2 SCR 59 at 63-64, Dickson CJC [Rio Hotel]; Criminal 
Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. 
7. See Part III, below. 
8. Only one major cooperative federalism case met the inclusion criteria. See Quebec v 
Canada, supra note 5. It is discussed in more detail in Part II(C) of this article. For writing 
on cooperative federalism in Canada, see e.g. Johanne Poirier, “Souveraineté parlementaire 
et armes à feu: le fédéralisme coopératif dans la ligne de mire?” (2015) 45 RDUS 47; 
WR Lederman, “Some Forms and Limitations of Co-Operative Federalism” (1967) 45 
Can Bar Rev 409; Eugénie Brouillet, “Te Supreme Court of Canada: Te Concept of 
Cooperative Federalism and Its Efect on the Balance of Power” in Nicholas Aroney & 
John Kincaid, eds, Courts in Federal Countries: Federalists or Unitarists? (University of 
Toronto Press, 2017) 135; Nigel Bankes, “Co-Operative Federalism: Tird Parties and 
Intergovernmental Agreements and Arrangements in Canada and Australia” (1991) 29 
Alta L Rev 792; Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, “Cooperative Federalism in Search 
of a Normative Justifcation: Considering the Principle of Federal Loyalty” (2014) 23 
Const Forum 1; Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens & Johanne Poirier, “From Dualism 
to Cooperative Federalism and Back?: Evolving and Competing Conceptions of Canadian 
Federalism” in Peter Oliver, Patrick Macklem & Nathalie Des Rosiers, eds, Te Oxford 
Handbook of the Canadian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2017) 391. 
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In cases of cooperative federalism, the obvious justifcation for courts to 
value government practice is deference to negotiation and agreement undertaken 
and reached by political equals. Tis study reveals that, even without that 
negotiated element, justices still pay attention to practice and consider it relevant 
to jurisdictional determinations. Tat is, unilateral practice, in the face of 
acquiescence or possibly even objection, is frequently given some deference by the 
justices of the Court; the fact of the practice itself matters, regardless of whether 
it is negotiated. It may be that focusing on negotiation to understand or justify 
outcomes in cooperative federalism cases is misguided: rather, this study suggests 
that justices fnd the practice itself to be important, with or without negotiation. 
Judicial attention to practice is consistent with both cooperative and dualist 
paradigms. Federal–provincial cooperation in Canada is often informal and 
political, as opposed to formal and legalised.9 In recent years, SCC jurisprudence 
has leaned toward encouraging and lauding these cooperative practices, though 
not uniformly.10 Gaudreault-DesBiens and Poirier observe that “[s]uch schemes 
are regarded with startling benevolence by courts, which are clearly at pains 
not to disrupt collaborative eforts displayed by the other two branches.”11 
Te phenomenon of judicial deference to practice in cooperative cases aligns 
with this broader trend. Similarly, judges or scholars subscribing to dualist 
conceptions of federalism can likewise justify judicial reliance on practice in the 
course of constitutional decision-making on the basis that unilateral practices 
are appropriate exercises of exclusive jurisdiction. Future research in this area 
should investigate the ways in which judicial references to government practice 
correspond with, or challenge, dualist or cooperative conceptions of federalism. 
Te article proceeds in three parts. First, the project and methodology are 
described. Second, the results of the study are discussed generally, followed by 
a more detailed taxonomy of uses, with examples provided. Te concluding 
section focuses largely on one particular use of past practice (as an interpretative 
tool) and considers possible explanations for why justices might use past practice 
in this manner. 
I. PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY 
I reviewed the Court’s sections 91 and 92 validity jurisprudence from the last ffty 
years and identifed twenty-eight cases in which at least one justice of the Court 
9. Gaudreault-DesBiens & Poirier, supra note 8 at 398-99. 
10. Poirier, supra note 8 at 89-90. 
11. Gaudreault-DesBiens & Poirier, supra note 8 at 399-400. 








referenced government practice or non-practice.12 Government practice was 
defned broadly as activity—including statutory and non-legislative activity— 
previously undertaken by a government and related somehow to the impugned 
statute or statutory provision.13 I also included express references to government 
non-practice. Tat is, if a justice noted an absence of prior activity by a government 
in the area, the case was included in the study, based on the theory that how 
justices treat non-practice provides insight into whether they think practice is 
signifcant. For example, if a justice believes a history of non-practice by the 
enacting government weighs against fnding validity, the justice has implicitly 
attached signifcance to the presence of practice.
 Because the Court has not articulated the role of practice in a conceptually 
coherent manner, justices generally do not clearly identify or isolate practice in 
their discussions. Rather, things that may constitute past practice are frequently 
referred to in brief and ambiguous language. As a result, in some cases, I had to 
exercise judgment about whether the justice had described government practice 
at all, thus warranting inclusion in the study. Discretion was exercised in favour 
of inclusion, rather than exclusion.14 
Note also the article is concerned with justices’ treatment of government 
practice, not with consideration of judicial precedent. Te article focuses on 
the signifcance justices attach to, for example, a history of federal regulation 
of abortion, and not judicial references to prior court decisions upholding 
that federal legislative activity. Te latter is precedential reasoning, a common 
and well-accepted interpretive technique. Te former—referencing the fact of 
12. Te period covered in the study is 1 January 1968 to 1 August 2018. Te ffty-year period 
ensured a large sample size while retaining manageability. Cases were gathered using a 
“snowball” technique. First, a research student consulted two leading constitutional texts 
to develop an initial list of relevant cases. See Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada,
2018 student ed (Tomson Reuters Canada, 2018); Guy Régimbald & Dwight Newman, 
Te Law of the Canadian Constitution, 2nd ed (LexisNexis Canada, 2017). Te student then 
read those cases, included all validity decisions cited therein, and canvassed this second round 
of cases for additional judgments not yet identifed. Tey repeated this process until no new 
cases were discovered. Finally, the student searched legal databases for any additional cases on 
point that had not turned up in the prior searches. Very few additional cases were discovered. 
In total, sixty-nine validity cases from the last fve decades were collected. Reviewing those 
cases, I identifed twenty-eight cases in which government practice or non-practice was 
referenced by at least one justice. For the list of cases, see Appendix A. 
13. In this article, the term “government practice” is used interchangeably with “legislative 
activity,” “past practice,” “legislative practice,” “historical activity,” and other similar terms. 
14. See e.g. MacDonald et al v Vapor Canada Ltd (1976), [1977] 2 SCR 134, Laskin CJC 
[Macdonald]. Tis case was ultimately included in the study. 
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government practice itself—is not widely recognised as an existing or legitimate 
interpretive technique. 
Limitations of the study must be noted. First, the study seeks to identify 
broad trends in judicial thinking and posit some plausible explanations for 
judicial reference to practice. Accordingly, majority, minority, and dissenting 
decisions receive relatively equal attention. Second, because the article aims to 
expose broader trends and develop generalised categories, the specifc practice at 
issue (including its longevity) is generally not identifed nor is the time period in 
which the practice originated (e.g., pre-Confederation or post-Confederation). 
Te more generalised focus of the article means it is impossible to reach frm 
conclusions about the extent to which references to practice correspond with 
originalist reasoning. 
A fnal note on terminology is in order. Tis article uses the language of 
“enacting government,” to refer to the government (i.e., federal or provincial) 
that has enacted the impugned legislation, and “opposing government,” to refer 
to the other level of government. Of course, in any particular case, the other level 
of government may not be legally opposing in the sense that the constitutional 
challenge may come from a private third party, but this terminology simplifes 
reference to the governments in a given case. 
II. RESULTS 
A review of cases reveals that legislative practice is sometimes relevant to validity 
decisions, though reference to it is inconsistent and unpredictable, and judicial 
explanations regarding its signifcance are brief, inadequate, or sometimes 
non-existent.15 While justices referred to legislative practice (or non-practice) in 
about 40 per cent of the validity cases from the last ffty years (twenty-eight of 
sixty-nine total cases), the Court has not provided conceptually clear instruction 
on when and how legislative practice assists in the resolution of validity claims. 
However, after reviewing the cases, some general observations can be made about 
the signifcance attached by SCC justices to legislative practice (or non-practice) 
in validity cases. 
First, it is clear that practice—even long-standing practice—does not, 
by itself, imbue a government with jurisdiction. For example, Justice Lamer, 
writing a separate concurring decision in Ontario Hydro v Ontario (Labour 
Relations Board),16 observed: 
15. For graphs illustrating results, see Appendix B. 
16. [1993] 3 SCR 327 [Ontario Hydro]. 
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Tere is no doctrine of laches in constitutional division of powers doctrine; one 
level of government’s failure to exercise its jurisdiction, or failure to intervene when 
another level of government exercises that jurisdiction, cannot be determinative of 
the constitutional analysis. In this respect, I would adopt the statement of Reed J. in 
Alberta Government Telephones v. Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications 
Commission, [1985] 2 F.C. 472 (T.D.), at p. 488: 
Te fact that constitutional jurisdiction remains unexercised for long periods of 
time or is improperly exercised for a long period of time, however, does not mean 
that there is thereby created some sort of constitutional squatters rights. (Refer: 
Attorney General of Manitoba v. Forest, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1032 for a case in which 
unconstitutional action had remained unchallenged for ninety years.)17 
More recently, the Court referred to the same principle in Reference Re Securities Act: 
A long-standing exercise of power does not confer constitutional authority to 
legislate, nor does the historic presence of the provinces in securities regulation 
preclude a federal claim to regulatory jurisdiction (see Ontario Hydro v. Ontario 
(Labour Relations Board), [1993] 3 S.C.R 327, at p. 357, per Lamer C.J.)18 
And indeed, the Court’s decisions comply with this principle: In no case under 
study did legislative practice solely determine jurisdiction. 
Some references to government practice appeared to be merely throw-away 
lines.19 However, in other instances, legislative practice appeared to play a role in 
validity determinations. I have identifed three ways in which this information 
is used by justices of the Court: (1) to understand the purpose of the impugned 
statute; (2) to interpret the constitutional text; and (3) to fulfl some other role 
in the validity analysis. Each category, with examples, is discussed in detail below. 
Before turning to these specifc categories of use, additional general observations 
can be made. Te historic presence of the enacting government in a legislative 
area was often predictive of a fnding of jurisdiction. In six of twenty-eight cases, 
a majority of the Court upheld the enacting government’s claim to jurisdiction 
and, in the course of its discussion, referred to the government’s previous activity 
17. Ibid at 357. 
18. 2011 SCC 66 [Securities Reference] at para 116. 
19. See e.g. Rio Hotel, supra note 6 at 68, Estey J (“[h]istorically, some provinces have in the 
past prohibited all forms of entertainment and all activities other than the consumption of 
the alcoholic beverages in these licensed premises” (ibid at 68)); Morgentaler, supra note 3 at 
491, Sopinka J (“since Confederation, and indeed before, the law of Canada has regarded as 
criminal, interference with pregnancy,” citing Morgentaler v Te Queen, [1976] 1 SCR 616 
(ibid at 672)). Te Court also stated that “[t]his legislation deals, by its terms, with a subject 
historically considered to be part of the criminal law—the prohibition of the performance of 
abortions with penal consequences. It is thus suspect on its face” (Ibid at 512). 
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in that area.20 In only one case did a majority of the Court arguably fnd that the 
enacting government lacked jurisdiction despite a history of legislating in the 
area (and in that case, the majority panel referred to the long-standing practice 
of the opposing government in that area of the law in coming to its conclusion 
that the impugned statute was unconstitutional).21 Tus, while justices insist that 
no doctrine of laches22 exists in division of powers jurisprudence, it is interesting 
to observe that, when faced with long-standing practice by one government, the 
Court tends to recognise that government’s constitutional competence to act.23 
Te historic absence of the enacting government from an area, or the historic 
presence of the opposing government in the area, was less predictive of the 
outcome. In four cases, a lack of legislative practice by the enacting government 
was not fatal to the jurisdictional claim.24 In fve cases, a majority of the Court 
denied the enacting government’s claim to jurisdiction, in part because the 
opposing government had previously acted in the area.25 In four cases, a majority 
found the enacting government had jurisdiction despite the presence of legislative 
practice by the opposing government.26 References to government practice have 
decreased over time, with nine cases each decade in the 1970s and 1980s, fve 
cases in the 1990s, two cases in the 2000s, and three in the 2010s. It is not clear 
why references to practice have decreased, but it may be that validity analysis has 
20. See Reference re Firearms Act (Can), 2000 SCC 31 [Firearms Reference]; Caloil Inc v Attorney 
General of Canada, [1971] SCR 543 [Caloil]; Whitbread v Walley, [1990] 3 SCR 1273 
[Whitbread]; R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1 SCR 295 [Big M]; Te Queen v Zelensky, 
[1978] 2 SCR 940 [Zelensky]; Di Iorio v Warden of the Montreal Jail (1976), [1978] 1 SCR 
152 [Di Iorio]. 
21. Scowby v Glendinning, [1986] 2 SCR 226 [Scowby]. 
22. Te “doctrine of laches” is defned by Black’s Law Dictionary as “[t]he equitable doctrine by 
which a court denies relief to a claimant who has unreasonably delayed in asserting the claim, 
when that delay has prejudiced the party against whom relief is sought.” See Bryan A Garner, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (Tomson Reuters, 2019) sub verbo “laches.” 
23. Tis outcome could be explained by justices applying an implicit or “lite” version of laches. 
It could also be explained by governments understanding their jurisdictional boundaries and 
acting accordingly. 
24. RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (AG), [1995] 3 SCR 199 [RJR-MacDonald]; Reference re 
Employment Insurance Act (Can), ss 22 and 23, 2005 SCC 56 [Employment Reference]; General 
Motors of Canada Ltd v City National Leasing, [1989] 1 SCR 641 [GM v CNL]; Attorney 
General of British Columbia v Canada Trust Co et al, [1980] 2 SCR 466 [BC v Canada Trust]. 
25. Scowby, supra note 21; Morgentaler, supra note 3; MacDonald, supra note 14; 
Robinson v Countrywide Factors Ltd (1977), [1978] 1 SCR 753 [Robinson]; Securities 
Reference, supra note 18. 
26. Nova Scotia Board of Censors v McNeil, [1978] 2 SCR 662 [Nova Scotia Board of Censors]; 
AG (Can) v Can Nat Transportation, Ltd, [1983] 2 SCR 206 [Canadian National Transport]; 
R v Wetmore, [1983] 2 SCR 284 [Wetmore]; R v Hauser, [1979] 1 SCR 984 [Hauser]. 
(2021) 58 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
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become tighter and more doctrinal, leaving less room for fuzzy, under-developed 
concepts with no clearly articulated role. 
Te following sections of the article discuss the specifc categories of use 
identifed above and provide examples of each type. 
A. TO IDENTIFY LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE 
In nine of the twenty-eight cases under study, justices used prior legislative activity 
to identify the “pith and substance” (or purpose) of the impugned legislation at 
the “characterization” step of the validity analysis.27 Two variations of this theme 
exist. In the frst—and more common—scenario, the justices used the enacting 
government’s practice to inform characterization, while in the second scenario, 
justices referenced the opposing government’s practice to determine the law’s 
pith and substance. 
R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd illustrates the frst scenario. While the Charter 
aspects of that case are perhaps better known, the claimant also challenged the 
federal Sunday closing legislation on division-of-powers grounds. Te statute’s 
validity turned on whether its purpose was secular or religious, as only the 
latter constituted a proper exercise of the federal criminal law power.28 Chief 
Justice Dickson, writing for a majority of the Court, concluded that the law was 
religious in nature, on the basis that observance of the Christian Sabbath had 
been mandated for centuries in English law, which was the predecessor of the 
27. Firearms Reference, supra note 20; Hauser, supra note 26, Pigeon J; Securities Reference, supra
note 18; Big M, supra note 20; Zelensky, supra note 20; R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd, 
[1986] 2 SCR 713 [Edwards Books]; Attorney-General for Manitoba v Manitoba Egg and 
Poultry Association et al, [1971] SCR 689, Laskin J (as he then was); Reference re Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act, 2010 SCC 61, LeBel & Deschamps JJ [Re AHRA]; and possibly 
MacDonald, supra note 14, Laskin CJC. Validity is a two-step inquiry: Identifying the 
“pith and substance” or “dominant thrust” of the legislation under consideration, and then 
assigning that matter to a head of power, which may require delineating that head of power. 
See Morgentaler, supra note 3 at 481. 
28. Big M, supra note 20 at 355. 
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impugned federal statute.29 Te legislative history of Sunday closing laws was 
thus relevant, and indeed vital, in determining the primary purpose of the federal 
statute. Tis use of legislative practice is uncontroversial, as it is now accepted that 
judges may refer to a statute’s legislative history in order to ascertain its meaning.30 
Te second scenario—in which justices invoked the opposing government’s 
legislative practice to ascertain the pith and substance of the enacting government’s 
statute—occurred less frequently. For example, in Securities Reference, because the 
proposed federal law largely duplicated provincial regulation of securities, the 
Court concluded that the federal law was directed at the same objective as the 
provincial legislation, namely, the exhaustive regulation of securities.31 
Justices LeBel and Deschamps employed the same reasoning in Reference 
Re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, a case dealing with the validity of federal 
legislation regulating assisted reproductive technologies.32 After reviewing 
the provincial regime governing medical professionals and certain medical 
practices, Justices LeBel and Deschamps observed that the federal law extensively 
overlapped with the provincial regulatory scheme.33 Tey relied on this fact, 
in part, to conclude that the law was aimed at “the regulation of assisted human 
reproduction as a health service.”34 
While the justices’ reasoning is not particularly detailed in these two 
cases, the theory seems to be that the enacting government, by implementing 
29. Big M can be contrasted with Edwards Books, another Sunday closing case, though one 
involving provincial legislation. In Edwards Books, past practice (the custom of closing 
on Sunday for religious reasons) was not determinative of the law’s pith and substance. 
Chief Justice Dickson found that the alignment of the Christian Sabbath with a socially 
and culturally accepted “pause day” was a matter of historical happenstance rather than 
an indication of the law’s religious purpose. See Edwards Books, supra note 20 at 739-52. 
By fnding that the past practice had little relevance to the law’s pith and substance, Edwards 
Books is unique in the cases under study. In other cases that referenced legislative practice at 
the characterization stage, the legislative history or past practice was highly infuential and 
essentially predictive of the law’s pith and substance. 
30. See e.g. Re Anti-Infation Act, [1976] 2 SCR 373; Morgentaler, supra note 3. Te investigation 
into legislative history has opened up since the 1980s with the loosening of restrictions on 
extrinsic evidence. See A Wayne MacKay, “Te Supreme Court of Canada and Federalism: 
Does/Should Anyone Care Anymore?” (2001) 80 Can Bar Rev 241 at 264. 
31. Ontario Hydro, supra note 18 at paras 93-106. 
32. Robinson, supra note 27 (where the Court split 4-4-1, with decisions authored by 
Chief Justice McLachlin, Justices LeBel and Deschamps, and Justice Cromwell (who 
wrote for himself )). 
33. Ibid at paras 224-26. 
34. Ibid at para 227. Chief Justice McLachlin found that the federal impact on research and 
medical practice was a mere incidental efect of the legislation and did not refect its 
dominant purpose (ibid at paras 31-32). 















a statutory scheme similar or identical to that of the opposing government, has 
accepted the opposing government’s articulation of the problem as well as its 
preferred approach. Tus, the enacting government has implicitly endorsed the 
opposing government’s intended purposes, efects, and selected means to achieve 
particular ends. In other words, by essentially duplicating another statute, the 
enacting government has adopted that statute’s “dominant thrust.” It follows 
that a court would understand the impugned legislation with reference to the 
opposing government’s statutory scheme. Te enacting government has invited 
that scrutiny by mirroring the approach of the opposing government. 
B. TO AID INTERPRETATION OF SECTIONS 91 AND 92 OF THE 
CONSTITUTION ACT, 1867 
In a handful of cases, justices used legislative practice as an interpretive aid to 
give meaning to the text of sections 91 and 92. In these cases, legislative practice 
was used in conjunction with other interpretive tools, such as textual analysis, 
originalism or founders’ intent reasoning,35 or reliance on precedent. Sometimes, 
justices expressly set out how legislative practice was relevant to constitutional 
interpretation; in other cases, the relevance was unexplained or ambiguous. Tis 
use of legislative practice appeared more frequently in cases from the 1970s and 
1980s. Several cases illustrate this category of use.36 
First, in Scowby v Glendinning, the Court considered a challenge to section 
7 of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code,37 which afrmed the rights to habeus 
corpus and to be free of arbitrary detention. Justice Estey, writing for the majority, 
found the provision ultra vires (in so far as it applied to arrest for Criminal Code
ofences) because it dealt with a historically criminal law subject.38 After citing 
several Criminal Code provisions dealing with arrest and detention, he wrote: 
35. See Benjamin Oliphant & Léonid Sirota, “Has the Supreme Court of Canada Rejected 
‘Originalism’?” (2016) 42 Queen’s LJ 107. Oliphant and Sirota suggest that originalism 
should be distinguished from founders’ intent reasoning. New originalism “seeks to ascertain 
the meaning its text had at the time of its entrenchment. Unlike the (subjective and private) 
intentions of the framers, this meaning was objective and public” (ibid at 126). 
36. See also Ontario Home Builders’ Association v York Region Board of Education, [1996] 2 SCR 
929 [Ontario Home Builders]; Robinson, supra note 25, Beetz J. 
37. Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, SS 1979, c S24.1. 
38. It is worth noting that Justice La Forest, dissenting, also attached signifcance to historical 
practice, though he focused on provincial practice (e.g., the enacting government’s practice). 
He observed that sanctions for improper police behaviour, in the form of civil claims, had 
a long history in provincial law. He also stated that the law should not “be frozen in this 
particular form.” Scowby, supra note 21 at 260. 
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[T]hese [federal] Code provisions are advanced to illustrate that the type of 
action taken by the provincial legislature in s. 7 has been, almost since the 
advent of Confederation, taken by the Parliament of Canada in the exercise of its 
exclusive sovereignty over criminal law. Tat is not to say that repetition produces 
constitutionality. It does, however, illustrate that the community through its elected 
representatives, and in the course of its criminal law enforcement system, has for at 
least a century regarded the arrest and detention provisions in the Criminal Code
as illustrations of the broadly defned approach to criminal law in the authorities, 
some of which have already been cited. Words in legislation, and more particularly, 
words employed in constitutional documents, take on meaning from the context 
in which they are employed in daily life. Te words “criminal law” and “criminal 
procedure” are no exception. Tese words have long been accepted by legislature 
and courts alike in the community as including legislation with reference to arrest 
and detention, arbitrary or otherwise. To the extent that these activities form the 
core and substance of habeas corpus, they have had criminal law connotations in 
our criminal jurisprudence in Canada and in its British predecessor from which our 
criminal law has evolved for over seven hundred years.39 
In Justice Estey’s view, the fact that the federal government had long dealt with 
arrest and detention in criminal law shed light on the proper interpretation to 
give “criminal law” and “criminal procedure” in section 91. Notice that, under 
Justice Estey’s conception, the practice did not attain constitutional status merely 
by virtue of its existence. Rather, Justice Estey referred to it in the course of 
applying a common interpretive technique—namely, textual interpretation. 
In other words, Justice Estey found the practice to be signifcant, not because 
it gave rise to jurisdiction in its own right (indeed, he emphasised that repeated 
practice did not crystalize into constitutional law), but because it assisted him in 
understanding the meaning of the text of the Constitution. In his view, text and 
practice are symbiotic: How words are understood dictates practice, and practice 
informs how those words are understood. While legislative tradition was not 
independently signifcant, Scowby demonstrates how practice might infuence 
application of common interpretive techniques. 
Similar reasoning is found in Di Iorio v Warden of the Montreal Jail. Quebec, 
acting pursuant to its Police Act,40 established a commission to investigate 
organised crime. Under the relevant statutory scheme, those who refused to 
testify faced sanction, including jail time.41 Justice Dickson, writing for fve 
justices, found that the province had the power to constitute such commissions 
under its jurisdiction over “the administration of justice in the province,” 
39. Ibid at 240-41. 
40. Police Act, SQ 1967-1968, c 17, s 19. 
41. Di Iorio, supra note 20 at 183-84. 







pursuant to section 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867. In his view, it mattered 
that the provinces had, since Confederation, understood their powers under this 
competence expansively and acted accordingly.42 He observed that the province 
had previously set up and empowered similar bodies.43 Tis practice informed his 
view that the founders intended for the province to retain these powers following 
Confederation.44 Justice Dickson concluded: 
Both the federal and provincial governments have accepted for over a century the 
status of the provincial governments to administer criminal justice within their 
respective boundaries. Te provincial mandate in that feld has consistently been 
recognized as part and parcel of the responsibility of a provincial government for 
public order within the province.…It seems late in the day to strip the provinces 
of jurisdiction in respect of criminal justice which they have exercised without 
challenge for well over one hundred years. Tat is not to say that jurisdiction in the 
strict sense can come through consent or laches; however, history and governmental 
attitudes can be helpful guides to interpretation.45 
Much like Justice Estey in Scowby, Justice Dickson in Di Iorio used legislative 
practice to inform or supplement other interpretive techniques (in this instance, 
what seems to be an appeal to founders’ intent). However, at times, some of 
his language is stronger than that found in Scowby—as in, for example, 
the above quoted paragraph—and borders on imbuing the practice with 
stand-alone signifcance, despite his insistence that laches forms no part of 
division of powers law. 
In Whitbread v Walley, Justice La Forest for the Court upheld provisions of 
the federal Shipping Act46 and relied on non-constitutional precedent to do so. 
He referred to cases regarding the Federal Court’s jurisdiction over particular 
42. Ibid at 200. 
43. Ibid at 203-04. 
44. Ibid at 203-06. In his separate concurring decision, Justice Beetz also referred to pre- and 
post-Confederation practice in the course of upholding the provincial law (ibid at 223). 
45. Ibid at 205-06. Chief Justice Laskin dissented in Di Iorio: In his view, legislative practice 
(both federal and provincial) before and following Confederation did not provide insight into 
the meaning of the words in the Constitution, at least in the context of that case. He wrote: 
[Te province’s argument] appears to be founded on the history of pre-confederation and 
post-confederation legislation respecting public inquiries (see 1844-46 (Can.), c. 38; C.S.C. 
1859, c. 13, s.1; 1986 (Can.), c. 38, ss. 1 and 2), and the exclusion from post-confederation 
federal legislation of the words “the administration of justice therein”, which were included in 
the pre-confederation inquiries legislation. Tis, in my opinion, begs the question because it 
does not give an answer to the scope of the power in relation to “the administration of justice 
in the Province” in the context of the British North America Act (ibid at 166). 
46. Canada Shipping Act, RSC 1970, c S9. 
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disputes (and not cases regarding the federal government’s constitutional 
jurisdiction), noting that these cases were not “irrelevant to a determination of 
the scope of Parliament’s legislative jurisdiction over navigation and shipping”47 
because the federal government could only empower the Federal Court to deal 
with matters within its constitutional competence.48 He added: 
Parliament’s power to enact collision regulations has never been challenged; nor… 
has it ever been contended that these regulations do not apply to vessels on inland 
waterways. Tey are in fact routinely applied to determine the tortious liability of 
such vessels…It follows that the tortious liability of the owners and operators of 
these vessels should be regarded as a matter of maritime law that comes within the 
ambit of Parliament’s jurisdiction in respect of navigation and shipping.49 
Justice La Forest was infuenced by long-standing legislative practice, including 
the fact that provincial governments had not objected to those federal enactments 
and that judges had previously applied the legislation in non-constitutional cases 
without expressing doubts about its constitutionality. As in Scowby and Di Iorio, 
legislative practice was relevant to the outcome, but unlike in those two cases, 
it was not used to assist in textual interpretation or originalism-type reasoning. 
Rather, Justice La Forest in Whitbread came close to fnding legislative practice 
signifcant in its own right, though without expressly acknowledging this. 
One might contrast Justice La Forest’s discussion in Whitbread to Chief Justice 
Laskin’s dissent in Robinson v Countrywide Factors Ltd, where the Chief Justice 
observed that prior cases resolving issues of statutory interpretation—and not 
constitutionality—provided no assistance on the constitutional issue.50 He wrote: 
“Tere are numerous illustrations in other branches of the law where practices 
carried on for some time without objection on constitutional grounds were 
brought to an end when the constitutional question was raised directly.”51 Tese 
competing statements illustrate the justices’ inconsistent treatment of practice. 
Finally, the line of cases concerning federal competence to prosecute 
ofences also includes references to legislative practice. Provinces have historically 
prosecuted criminal ofences in Canada.52 Te federal government only asserted 
47. Whitbread, supra note 20 at 1289. 
48. Ibid at 1290. 
49. Ibid at 1296. 
50. Robinson, supra note 25 at 774-76. 
51. Ibid at 774. 
52. Provincial activity in this area mostly took the form of actual practice, though some 
provincial legislation existed. See Nancy E Brown, “Balancing the Powers to Prosecute in 
Canada: Comment on A.G. Canada v. C.N. Transport and R. v. Wetmore, Kripps Pharmacy,”
Case Comment, (1984) 29 McGill LJ 699 at 704-05. 












jurisdiction over prosecutions in the late 1960s.53 Te Court considered and 
ultimately upheld the federal government’s jurisdiction to prosecute in a line of 
cases from the 1970s and 1980s.54 For Justice Dickson, who dissented in these 
cases, it mattered that the federal government was attempting to step into an 
area historically occupied by the provinces.55 Much like his decision in Di Iorio, 
he emphasised that constitutional competence was not granted by laches, but 
that governmental practice still warranted consideration. For example, in R v
Hauser, he wrote: 
Te enactment of s. 2(2) of the Criminal Code may be viewed as not only an 
attempt to intrude into matters traditionally reserved for the provincial Attorneys 
General, but also as a breach of the bargain struck at the time of Confederation. 
No practical reasons have been advanced for setting aside the practices and customs 
of one hundred years.…From the material before us, it would not appear that the 
arrangement existing between the federal and provincial authorities, to which I have 
referred earlier, had created any difculties over the years. Tis, of course, does not 
decide the matter because we are dealing here essentially with constitutional power 
and not with the efect of alleged federal acquiescence, but the considerations I 
mention are by no means irrelevant.56 
Similarly, Justice Dickson dissented again four years later in R v Wetmore, observing: 
If, as the Attorney General of Canada contends, the provinces have for over one 
hundred years been exercising, if not usurping, a jurisdiction not properly theirs, the 
provinces would seem to have been blissfully unaware of the fact, so also the Federal 
Crown. One can look in vain among the Confederation Debates, subsequent case 
law, the text books, other writings on the Constitution for any frm assertion on 
the part of the Attorney General of Canada that the primary and, indeed, exclusive, 
prosecutorial authority in criminal cases rests, and has always rested, with the 
Federal Crown. Where is there a federal statement to this efect: “We, by virtue of s. 
91(27) of the Constitution, have sufered you, the provinces, to prosecute criminal 
cases but we, at any time, can deny you that right.”57 
Chief Justice Laskin, writing for the majority in Wetmore and its companion 
case, AG (Canada) v. Canadian National Transportation, Ltd, disagreed with 
Justice Dickson. In his view, provincial prosecutions had continued following 
53. See Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1968-69, c 38, s 2(2). 
54. Hauser, supra note 26; Canadian National Transport, supra note 26; Wetmore, supra note 26. 
55. Regarding Chief Justice Dickson’s federalism decisions, Bryan Schwartz has observed that he 
“was prepared to give some respect to the actual practice of democratic accountable branches 
of government as a guide to interpreting the constitution.” See Bryan Schwartz, “Dickson on 
Federalism: Te First Principles of His Jurisprudence” (1991) 20 Man LJ 473 at 474-75. 
56. Hauser, supra note 26 at 1032-33. 
57. Wetmore, supra note 26 at 303. 
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Confederation as a “practical accommodation” under the authority of section 
129 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which provided for the continuance of laws in 
force in the colonies prior to Confederation.58 Te ongoing provincial practice, 
he emphasised, neither undermined federal claims to jurisdiction nor imposed 
any type of constitutional barrier or limitation on federal power.59 Chief Justice 
Laskin expressly noted the lack of provincial eforts “to assert an independent 
provincial authority to control prosecutions of the criminal law,”60 which he 
believed would be expected if the provinces had, in fact, retained jurisdiction 
in this feld.61 Although Justice Dickson’s decisions in these cases more robustly 
embrace the signifcance of practice, Chief Justice Laskin did not completely 
reject the idea that practice could play a role in validity determinations. Indeed, 
the Chief Justice took pains to explain why the practice in the context of these 
cases was not determinative, suggesting that he may well have given practice 
more weight in cases where the practice has clearly “crystalized,” such as when 
it is accompanied by an express assertion of provincial authority in the area. 
It appears that the Chief Justice wanted additional indicia of the practice’s value 
before assigning it weight. 
Tese cases demonstrate another type of gravitational pull that legislative 
practice may have in validity determinations. While repeated practice does 
not, by itself, elevate that practice to the status of constitutional law, justices 
occasionally use practice to inform or facilitate other interpretive techniques 
or attach some signifcance to it in the course of determining the scope of 
sections 91 and 92. 
58. Canadian National Transport, supra note 26 at 221, 225, 235. 
59. Ibid at 225, 235. 
60. Ibid at 225. 
61. Ibid. 




C. OTHER INSTANCES OF IMPACTING VALIDITY DECISIONS 
On occasion, justices referred to legislative practice for some purpose other than 
those discussed above.62 In particular, practice may have evidentiary value or may 
satisfy an additional component of the validity analysis. 
Regarding the frst type of situation, justices have found that legislative 
practices may be evidence of governments’ factual claims. For example, Chief 
Justice Lamer in Ontario Hydro observed that federal failure to exercise jurisdiction 
could undermine the government’s factual claim that federal competence over 
the subject matter was necessary (an element of the national concern branch of 
POGG—or “peace, order, and good government”—power and of the section 
92(10)(c) declaratory power, the heads of power at issue in that case).63 Only a 
handful of federal heads of power employ some form of provincial inability test, 
and thus, the evidentiary use of legislative practice may be confned to those few 
heads of power. 
On occasion, members of the Court have attributed signifcance to historical 
practice when considering particular aspects of the validity analysis. For example, 
in Reference re Firearms Act, the Court stated that the “balance of federalism” 
must be considered when weighing jurisdictional claims.64 Te federal gun 
control law did not upset the jurisdictional balance, the Court ruled, relying in 
part on the fact that the federal government had historically regulated frearms. 
Te Court wrote: 
62. See also Nova Scotia Board of Censors, supra note 26 at 679-86 (per Chief Justice Laskin 
(dissenting), referring to both the Criminal Code and precedent in fnding that the federal 
government has jurisdiction over the obscenity-type regulation at issue); Multiple Access 
Ltd v McCutcheon, [1982] 2 SCR 161 at 173-75 (per Justice Dickson (as he then was), 
observing in passing that provinces have historically regulated securities in Canada, 
but with no signifcance expressly attributed to it); Caloil, supra note 20 at 551-52 (per 
Justice Pigeon, referring to long-standing legislation when fnding that the trial judge had 
erroneously found the entire scheme—not just the impugned provisions—to be invalid). 
See also RJR-MacDonald, supra note 24 at para 204 (per Justice Major, dissenting on the 
federalism issue): 
I disagree that afnity with a traditional criminal law concern has no part to play in the 
analysis, whether the conduct proscribed by Parliament has an afnity with a traditional 
criminal law concern is a starting point in determining whether a particular matter comes 
within federal criminal competence. Cases such as Morgentaler, supra, and Knox Construction, 
supra, demonstrate that courts will often look for an afnity with a traditional criminal law 
concern, or afnity with activities historically recognized as criminal, to determine whether a 
certain exercise of legislative power falls within the feld of criminal law. 
63. Ontario Hydro, supra note 16 at 357. 
64. Firearms Reference, supra note 20 at para 48. 
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[T]his law does not precipitate the federal government’s entry into a new feld. Gun 
control has been the subject of federal law since Confederation. Tis law does not 
allow the federal government to signifcantly expand its jurisdictional powers to the 
detriment of the provinces.65 
Under the framework articulated in that case, legislative practice does not 
directly contribute to the meaning of the constitutional text—but by acting as an 
indicator or perhaps determinant of jurisdictional balance—it still plays a role in 
setting the scope of the heads of powers. 
Somewhat similarly, in Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, Chief 
Justice McLachlin employed the ancillary doctrine66 to determine whether certain 
regulatory provisions of the impugned federal act could be upheld because of their 
connection to the rest of the intra vires scheme. In applying the ancillary doctrine 
test from General Motors of Canada Ltd v City National Leasing, she observed 
that a prior intrusion into the opposing government’s jurisdiction meant that the 
intrusion under consideration was more likely to be a minor one, rather than a 
major one. She wrote: 
Finally, I turn to Parliament’s history of legislating in the feld occupied by the 
ancillary provisions. Parliament has long sought to address issues of morality, health, 
and security. As discussed above, it has also invoked the criminal law power to uphold 
regulatory schemes. Of particular relevance is Parliament’s history of administering 
and enforcing these statutes, often by way of licensing bodies like the Agency: see 
Firearms Reference; Hydro-Québec. Tese historical comparisons suggest that the 
ancillary provisions constitute only a minor intrusion on provincial powers.67 
Tough a bit unclear, Chief Justice McLachlin seems to attribute signifcance to 
both legislative practice and judicial precedent. Her approach may be at odds 
with GM v CNL, which developed the modern ancillary doctrine test. In that 
case, Chief Justice Dickson referred only to the fact that past intrusions of this 
nature had been upheld, not to the fact that they had been committed in the 
65. Ibid at para 53. 
66. Ancillary doctrine salvages an otherwise unconstitutional provision because that provision is 
a crucial element of a larger, valid statutory scheme. See GM v CNL, supra note 24. 
67. Re AHRA, supra note 27 at para 136. Tis fnding has implications for the standard of 
connection required between the act and the provisions. Te standard is less stringent in cases 
of minor intrusions. In other words, minor intrusions are easier to justify and thus more 
likely to be upheld. 
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frst place.68 Te diference matters: Te former rests on the Court’s decisions to 
legitimise the invasion, while the latter relies on the government’s own actions to 
validate the intrusion. It is worth noting that Justices LeBel and Deschamps in Re
AHRA took issue with Chief Justice McLachlin’s reasoning: 
Te Chief Justice applies three criteria to justify the overfow from federal 
jurisdiction. In General Motors, Dickson C.J. did in fact identify three factors that 
justifed the impugned overfow in that case: the provision was a remedial one, such 
overfows were not unprecedented, and the overfow in that case was limited. We 
do not believe that these factors can be applied automatically without reference to 
the context, however. Indeed, it would be surprising if a past overfow from the 
jurisdiction of one level of government could serve to justify subsequent overfows 
without eroding the heads of power concerned.69 
Justices LeBel and Deschamps also appear to mischaracterise Chief Justice 
Dickson’s decision in GM v CNL. Because the Court has not clearly isolated 
practice as a signifcant factor, there is a real risk that justices may confuse 
references to practice with references to precedent, which is what occurred here. 
Instead of calling for a discretionary and circumstance-dependent application of 
the GM v CNL factors (which may present problems in practice), Justices LeBel 
and Deschamps could have criticised the Chief Justice’s decision by pointing 
out that she departed from GM v CNL when looking to practice rather than 
precedent. Given the split bench in Re AHRA and the lack of clarity in the Chief 
Justice’s reasoning on that point, it seems unlikely that, going forward, the Court 
will be open to more wide-spread use of historical practice in ancillary doctrine 
determinations. 
Finally, and unexpectedly, practice was rarely paired with cooperative 
federalism. I anticipated that the Court would endorse cooperative federalism 
schemes on the basis that they aligned with existing practice, but this reasoning 
was generally not present in the cases under study. Only one case included in 
the study dealt with cooperative federalism in depth, Québec v Canada, which 
68. GM v CNL, supra note 24 at 673. Te Chief Justice in GM v CNL wrote: 
Te third relevant fact is that it is well-established that the federal government is not 
constitutionally precluded from creating rights of civil action where such measures may be 
shown to be warranted. Tis Court has sustained federally-created civil actions in a variety of 
contexts: see Nykorak v. Attorney General of Canada, [1962] S.C.R. 331 (allowing the federal 
Crown to sue a private party for the loss of services of a member of the armed forces); Jackson 
v. Jackson, [1973] S.C.R. 205; Zacks v. Zacks, [1973] S.C.R. 891 (upholding the corollary relief 
provisions of the Divorce Act respecting alimony, maintenance or custody); and Multiple Access 
Ltd. v. McCutcheon, supra (upholding a civil remedy against directors and ofcers of federally 
incorporated companies who engaged in insider trading). 
69. Re AHRA, supra note 27 at para 195. 
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concerned the federal government’s decision to repeal the long-gun registry and 
destroy the data gathered pursuant to it. Québec argued that the destruction of 
the data was ultra vires and sought an order compelling the federal government 
to hand over the information. Te majority of the Court found in favour of the 
federal government, while dissenting Justices LeBel, Abella, Wagner, and Gascon, 
found that, because the data was the product of a cooperative scheme, the federal 
government lacked jurisdiction to unilaterally destroy it. 
Te majority and dissent in Québec v Canada difered on the signifcance 
attributable to the existence of a cooperative practice. For the majority, the 
cooperative practice that developed could not displace the rigid contours of the 
constitutional text. Tey noted that cooperative federalism is both a descriptive 
and legal principle, one that “has been invoked to provide fexibility in separation 
of powers doctrines.”70 However, they adopted a more traditional, “watertight 
compartments” view of federalism in observing that “[t]he principle of cooperative 
federalism…cannot be seen as imposing limits on the otherwise valid exercise of 
legislative competence.”71 Accordingly, cooperative practices must give way to the 
recognised constitutional authority to act unilaterally. 
Te dissent took quite a diferent view, fnding that the existence of a 
cooperative practice must play a role in the analysis. Having found the existence 
of a partnership between the federal and provincial government geared at 
creating, sharing, and using data for gun control purposes, the dissent observed 
that the validity analysis must take into account the federalism principle and 
the need to respect cooperative federalism arrangements.72 In fnding that 
cooperative practice could (and did) impose certain obligations on governments, 
the dissent elevated a particular type of practice—cooperation—and recognised 
that it had the power to shape constitutional duties and powers. In the absence 
of cooperative practice, the federal government could have acted unilaterally, but 
the cooperative relationship changed the equation. Cooperative practice thus had 
the power to afect constitutional boundaries. 
D. GOVERNMENT PRACTICE AND “LIVING TREE” CONSTITUTIONALISM 
In several cases, the enacting government sought to introduce legislation either in 
an area it had previously not legislated on or in a form that difered substantially 
from past iterations. On multiple occasions, members of the Court indicated 
that historic absence from a feld did not preclude a successful jurisdictional 
70. Québec v Canada, supra note 5 at para 17. 
71. Ibid at para 19. 
72. Ibid at paras 148-56. 












claim,73 but, sometimes, an enacting government was unsuccessful in its attempt 
to move into the new area.74 However, in no case did a “substantial diference” (as 
characterised by the Court) between the enacting government’s past legislation 
and the impugned statute prove fatal to its jurisdictional claim. In several cases, 
members of the Court observed that the heads of powers in sections 91 and 92 
were not “frozen in time.”75 
In four of the decisions contemplated by this study, the “living tree”76 
doctrine was expressly referenced in relation to federalism issues.77 In three of 
these cases, the enacting government sought to extend its jurisdiction in new ways 
(whether into a new area or in a new form), and it was successful in two of those 
cases. Consider, for example, the Reference re Employment Insurance Act, in which 
the Court considered the validity of a federal law providing for maternity and 
parental benefts to workers. Justice Deschamps, writing for the Court, rejected 
the argument that federal jurisdiction was confned by the manner in which it 
had been exercised previously.78 According to Justice Deschamps, the way the 
government had legislated in the past did not constrain its ability to exercise that 
competence in novel ways in the future, or, to put it in the “practice” language 
used in this article: the type or mode of past practice did not limit the types of 
future practice permitted in that same area. 
One might be tempted to argue that Justice Deschamps’s decision—in 
so far as it suggests that practice reveals little about the content or scope of 
jurisdiction—undermines my claim in this article that the Court pays attention 
to past and existing government practice. However, her reasoning addresses the 
importance of the details of the practice, which is not at odds with the claim that 
the practice, in itself, attracts judicial interest. 
73. See e.g. Ontario Hydro, supra note 16 at 357-58. 
74. See e.g. Securities Reference, supra note 18. 
75. See e.g. RJR-MacDonald, supra note 24 at para 28, La Forest J, at para 204, Major J (criminal 
law power); Zelensky, supra note 20 at 951, Laskin CJC (criminal law power); GM v CNL, 
supra note 24 at 668, Dickson CJC (the trade and commerce power); BC v Canada Trust, 
supra note 24 at 478, Dickson J (as he then was) (provincial taxing power); Martin Service 
Station Ltd v Minister of National Revenue (1976), [1977] 2 SCR 996 at 997, 1006, Beetz J 
(federal jurisdiction over unemployment insurance). 
76. Edwards v Canada (Attorney General) (1929), [1930] 1 DLR 98 at 106 (PC). 
77. Employment Reference, supra note 24 at para 9; Securities Reference, supra note 18 at para 
56; Ontario Home Builders, supra note 36 at para 145, La Forest J, concurring; Ontario 
Hydro, supra note 16 at 409, Iacobucci J, dissenting, citing Peter W Hogg, “Te Charter of 
Rights and American Teories of Interpretation” (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall LJ 87 at 97-98; 
BC v Canada Trust, supra note 24 at 467, 478-79, Dickson J (as he then was). 
78. Employment Reference, supra note 24 at paras 39, 47, 49. 
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One of the more surprising fndings of this study is that justices did not treat 
legislative practice as a type of living tree constitutionalism. Prior to undertaking 
the study, I predicted that references to practice would appear alongside living 
tree reasoning. For example, one might predict that the Court would point to 
government practice as a changed social or political reality (or as a refection of 
that changed reality) that warranted application of living tree reasoning. However, 
this type of reasoning did not manifest in the cases under study. In fact, legislative 
practice was rarely paired with living tree constitutionalism, and the two were on 
occasion presented as opposing forces, such as in Justice Deschamps’s decision in 
Reference re Employment Insurance Act, discussed above. In that case, legislative 
practice was opposed to living tree constitutionalism; taking a frozen-in-time 
approach based on past practice that restricted the federal head of power, 
in contrast to a dynamic living tree approach, not constrained by past modes 
of practice. Under Justice Deschamps’s conception, living tree constitutionalism 
could be thwarted or frustrated by honouring or adhering to legislative practice. 
III. CONCLUSION 
A review of SCC decisions from the last 50 years reveals that government practice 
is not irrelevant to jurisdictional claims. Judicial references to practice, at least on 
occasion, appear to be more than just throw-away lines or rhetorical fourishes. 
Justices sometimes discuss practice in ways that imbue it with signifcance 
(even though they do not aford it the status of a primary determinant), and 
the outcomes of cases tend to align with existing practice. To be clear, the exact 
nature of past practice’s signifcance is ambiguous and judicial reliance on it is 
variable and dependent, rather than consistent and independent. 
Judicial reference to government practice falls into one of three general 
categories. First, government practice is used at the characterization step of a 
validity analysis, to assist in identifcation of a law’s pith and substance. Te 
Court has expressly acknowledged the relevance of legislative practice to this 
exercise and routinely considers the legislative history of statutes at this stage. 
Second, justices occasionally use historical practice when addressing secondary 
aspects of validity analyses, for example the jurisdictional balance requirement 
or the ancillary doctrine. Te Court has not articulated a clear position on use 
of past practice for these purposes, and the disagreement between the justices 
in Re AHRA suggests that this approach is controversial and may be subject to 
reconsideration in the future. Tird, justices refer to legislative practice when 
interpreting the meaning of sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. 







As discussed above, government practice appears to play a concrete, though 
supplemental, role in interpretation. Te case law suggests that it may have 
a “plus value” in interpretation, even though it falls short of a stand-alone 
interpretive technique. 
How might one explain justices’ appeal to government practice in 
interpretation? Consideration of practice does not ft easily with usual and 
well-accepted interpretive techniques.79 Although the Court has not explained 
why references to practice assist interpretation of the constitutional text, it is worth 
asking whether a plausible explanation for this use of practice can be identifed. 
Te following discussion, which canvasses possible explanations, is preliminary 
and far from exhaustive. Still, it is intended to provide a basis for further academic 
dialogue on the topic. Six alternative explanations are ofered: Justices are giving 
efect to, or are engaged in, a type of interpretation of (1) customary law, (2) 
originalism, or (3) traditionalism. Alternatively, the trend is explained by the 
Court’s discomfort with deciding federalism questions, either because these are 
(4) political questions, (5) there is room for coordinate construction in this area, 
or (6) the Court is using practice as a screen to give efect to other values. 
Te frst suggestion—that justices are giving efect to, or are engaged in, 
interpreting customary law—can be dismissed fairly safely. Te argument 
might be that justices are merely recognizing customary law when they afrm 
long-standing government practice.80 However, this explanation is unsatisfactory 
given the Court’s express rejection of laches or an equivalent in the division of 
powers context. Nor does this explanation ft with practice’s “plus value” status, 
as one would expect practice to be the sole or primary determinant, rather than a 
supplemental factor, were justices simply recognizing customary law. 
An alternative explanation might be that the justices are employing a form 
of originalist interpretation. Originalism, as discussed by Léonid Sirota and 
Benjamin Oliphant, requires interpretation of the constitution with reference 
to the “public meaning” of the words at the time the statute was enacted.81 
Originalism and judicial consideration of practice clearly have some intersection. 
79. See Marc O DeGirolami, “Te Traditions of American Constitutional Law” (2020) 95 
Notre Dame L Rev 1123 at 1126-34 (discussing Philip Bobbitt’s study on constitutional 
methodology). See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Teory of the Constitution (Oxford 
University Press, 1982). 
80. For a discussion of customary law in separation of powers disputes in the United States, 
see e.g. David J Bederman, Custom as a Source of Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2010) at 108-13. 
81. “Originalist Reasoning in Canadian Constitutional Jurisprudence” (2017) 50 UBC L 
Rev 505 at 506-07. 
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A pre-Confederation practice may shed light on the original public meaning of 
a particular word or phrase. If practice is treated as a mechanism to ascertain the 
original meaning of text, and valued only for its ability to do so, it may be thought 
of as “just another form of originalism.”82 Because this study focused on general 
trends rather than specifc details of practices, it is not possible to say whether the 
practices in the cases considered were always pre-Confederation practices. But 
certainly, justices did not always pair practice with originalist reasoning. Practice 
and originalism, while sharing some conceptual overlap, do not align entirely. 
If practice is signifcant in its own right, then even practices which developed 
after Confederation are still infuential. For an originalist, practices post-dating 
the enactment of the Constitution are irrelevant to the interpretive exercise.83 
Originalist reasoning may explain some judicial references to historical practice, 
but it is not clear that it explains all of the cases under study. 
It is possible that justices could be engaged in traditional interpretation. 
American scholar Marc O. DeGirolami describes traditionalism as an 
interpretive technique that “focuses on practices, rather than abstract principles 
or general tests, as informing constitutional meaning.”84 DeGirolami’s recent 
article reviews traditionalism in American constitutional jurisprudence, fnding 
that long-standing practices exert a legal pull, though he observes that “[t]he 
interpretive infuence of a tradition is presumptive only and may be overcome by 
other considerations.”85 While this description has some appeal, justices did not 
describe their reasoning as “traditionalist” and, further, traditionalism does not 
perfectly explain the cases under study. DeGirolami observes that traditionalism 
is a free-standing interpretative technique, whereas justices often referenced 
practice in the course of engaging with other interpretative techniques. Tat is, 
practice seems to have a “plus value” that piggy-backs on other techniques but is 
not generally treated as an independent analytical aid. 
Decisions that align with, rather than depart from, practice may suggest 
that justices are more comfortable endorsing arrangements that governments 
have come to themselves, rather than imposing new arrangements upon them. 
As noted earlier, the Court’s modern embrace of cooperative federalism as an 
interpretative principle also reinforces the conclusion that the Court prefers, 
82. Bederman, supra note 80 at 109. 
83. For a description of the distinction between traditionalists and originalists, see DeGirolami, 
supra note 79 at 1166-67. 
84. Ibid at 1125. See also Cass R Sunstein, “Against Tradition” in Fred D Miller Jr, Ellen Frankel 
Paul & Jefrey Paul, eds, Te Communitarian Critique of Liberalism (Cambridge University 
Press, 1996) 207. 
85. DeGirolami, supra note 79 at 1125. 





at least to some extent, to defer to government practice. Tis article has revealed 
that the Court’s reluctance to upset existing practice extends outside the 
cooperative realm, where one could plausibly attribute judicial deference to the 
value placed on government negotiation and compromise. Rather, this deference 
extends to unilateral practices that are undertaken by the enacting government 
without objection from the opposing government (and possibly in the face of 
objection). Tis reluctance to intervene in the status quo may refect a deeper 
discomfort with the Court’s role as an arbitrator of federalism disputes. 
Te idea that federalism disputes are political questions—and thus 
inappropriate for judicial review—can be found in American and some Canadian 
scholarship.86 Te idea relies on the notion that, as between two sovereign 
governments, political negotiation is the preferred mechanism of dispute 
resolution; or, as Patrick Monahan put it in his 1984 article: “Te claim is simply 
that federalism issues are inescapably political and there is no plausible reason for 
removing them from the political arena.”87 For example, in his 1974 book In the 
Last Resort, Paul Weiler argued that as “social and political change rendered the 
specifc sections of the frozen constitution outmoded,”88 federalism jurisprudence 
became less legalistic and more policy-oriented, to the point that talking about 
applying the law was essentially illusionary.89 As a result, he concluded, a “judicial 
umpire” was not needed to oversee the contemporary Canadian federation.90 
Rather, Weiler proposed, “the better technique for managing confict is continual 
negotiation and political compromise.”91 In Weiler’s view, the Court’s recent 
tendency to uphold legislation suggested that the Court itself was aware of the 
need for “judicial restraint in the area of federalism.”92 
86. See Richard Simeon & Beryl A Radin, “Refections on Comparing Federalism: Canada 
and the United States” (2010) 40 Publius 357 at 363; Lynn A Baker & Ernest A Young, 
“Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review” (2001) 51 Duke LJ 75; Paul 
Weiler, In the Last Resort: A Critical Study of the Supreme Court of Canada (Carswell, 1974) at 
164-85; Patrick J Monahan, “At Doctrine’s Twilight: Te Structure of Canadian Federalism” 
(1984) 34 UTLJ 47. See also Gerald Baier, Courts and Federalism: Judicial Doctrine in the 
United States, Australia, and Canada (UBC Press, 2006). See also Léonid Sirota, “Federalism 
and Democracy: A Defence of Federalism-Based Judicial Review” (2012) [unpublished], 
online: www.ssrn.com/abstract=2162161 (arguing that federalism disputes are properly 
resolvable by courts). 
87. Monahan, supra note 86 at 96. 
88. Weiler, supra note 86 at 172. 
89. Ibid at 173. 
90. Ibid at 172-79. 
91. Ibid at 175. 
92. Ibid at 179. 
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Tis article’s account of judicial attention to government practice may suggest 
an underlying unease on the part of the judiciary with federalism review, and a 
desire to alleviate that unease by giving efect to existing government practice. 
In this way, the phenomenon discussed in this article may support Weiler’s claim 
that the Court has moved away from active intervention in federalism cases due 
to its awareness of the political nature of these disputes. However, given the 
long-standing tradition of judicial review of federalism issues in Canada and the 
lack of express confrmation by the Court that these issues are largely political in 
nature, a satisfactory explanation for judicial references to practices cannot rest 
solely on claims of the non-justiciability of federalism. 
Alternatively, coordinate construction—the theory that, in addition to courts, 
governments have a legitimate role to play in constitutional interpretation— 
might explain judicial appeal to government practice. Dennis Baker explains the 
principle this way: 
Coordinate interpretation means that each branch of government—executive, 
legislative, and judicial—is entitled and obligated to exercise its constitutional 
powers in accordance with its own interpretation of what the constitution entails.… 
[T]he interpretive power is shared between institutions in the course of an unfolding 
process of constitutional interpretation (in stark contrast to the unilateral “lightning 
strike” of interpretive authority claimed by judicial supremacists). For the coordinate 
theorist, it is only through repeated inter-institutional exchange that enduring 
constitutional principles emerge.93 
Te cases under study revealed a pattern of preferring arrangements already 
developed by government and deferring to de facto exercises of jurisdiction. One 
might be inclined to read into this pattern the Court’s implicit endorsement of 
a government’s view of the scope of its jurisdiction. In other words, references 
to government practice could signal justices’ belief that governments have 
a legitimate say in their legal authority: Governments’ interpretation of the 
division of powers is entitled to some respect. Again, this explanation appears 
lacking, as the justices do not describe what they are doing in these terms, nor 
does it account for the inconsistent references to practice. If governments have a 
legitimate role to play in determining the scope of their own powers, one would 
expect government practice to be referenced in all validity decisions. 
93. Dennis Rene Baker, Not Quite Supreme: Te Courts and Coordinate Constitutional 
Interpretation (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010) at 4-5. Baker’s description of 
coordinate construction largely involves scenarios in which a legislature responds to a judicial 
ruling, rather than this sort of scenario wherein a court is confronted with long-standing 
government practice. 
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Finally, it is possible that justices use practice to draw on ideas or values 
that are important to constitutional or intergovernmental arrangements, even 
if those ideas or values are not capable of precise elaboration (or, alternatively, 
justices are uncomfortable articulating these values and ideas expressly because 
they have previously stated that these values do not play a role in the validity 
analysis). In other words, it may be that government practice acts as a “stand-in” 
or proxy for certain values or ideas to which the Court desires to give efect. For 
example, a court that endorses existing government practice may be giving efect 
to the value of efciency. Without the beneft of evidence about the economic 
benefts and costs of alternative arrangements (the sort of evidence the Court has 
indicated is not relevant to the resolution of federalism disputes),94 justices may 
be inclined to assume that the current arrangement refects the most efcient 
state of afairs. Tat is, the government that can act at the lowest cost has done so 
and the other level of government has refrained from acting because of the higher 
costs to it. Tus, endorsing the status quo may seem to approve and value (what 
is perceived to be) the most efcient solution to the problem. If this is the case, 
then “practice” is really a “back door” that allows the Court to consider values 
like efciency, which it is not otherwise permitted to consider. Relatedly, justices 
might be using existing practice as a “stand-in” for pragmatism or restraint. 
Because federalism decisions in the modern era can have profoundly expensive 
and tumultuous implications for government policy and organization, the Court 
may be reluctant to upset the “apple cart.” An endorsement of existing practice 
gives primacy to values of moderation, restraint, and certainty. However, if this 
is what justices are really doing when they appeal to practice, then the Court is 
obscuring the values and principles that actually have weight in federalism cases. 
None of the possible explanations canvassed above completely justify judicial 
references to government practice. While some parts of the theory resonate for 
each explanation, some other parts do not. Te underlying commonality for all 
explanations, though, is the idea that courts owe some deference to the existing 
arrangements that governments have developed. For scholars who argue that 
courts ought to respect government traditions or conceptions of constitutional 
responsibilities, they may take comfort in this review of cases, which has revealed 
a consensus among many SCC justices: Governments’ own practices matter to 
the resolution of federalism issues. 
94. See e.g. R v Comeau, 2018 SCC 15 at para 83; Securities Reference, supra note 18 at para 90. 
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V.  APPENDIX B – RESULTS 
FIGURE 1: WHEN IS PRACTICE MENTIONED? 
NOTE: Because practice is mentioned multiple times in some cases, results do not total 28. 
FIGURE 2: HOW PRACTICE RELATES TO OUTCOME 
NOTE: Te results do not total 28, as some cases did not ft within any of these descriptions 
and some cases ft within multiple descriptions, due to diferences between majority and 
dissenting opinions. 
